"It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war."
-John F. Kennedy
Berlin Crisis
In 1958 Nikita Khrushchev demanded the United States, Britain, and France withdraw their forces from West Berlin. These countries' refusal to do so sparked the Berlin Crisis that would continue for the next three years and result in the building of the Berlin Wall. The following documents examine U.S. policy options during the crisis as well as the response to the building of the Berlin Wall.
Source 2.1: Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State
May 25, 1961.
BERLIN AND GERMANY
(Khrushchev will undoubtedly raise; if not, President should.)
Two and a half years into the Berlin Crisis it appeared as though the only options were to abandon Berlin or risk open conflict with the Soviets. The purpose of this position paper created by the State Department was to examine a potential middle ground. The State Department believed that the status quo in Berlin was a problem for the USSR but that the Soviets needed to realize changes in that status quo presented the possibility of much greater risks. It encouraged the president to stress to the Soviets the importance of Berlin to us as well as the opportunity for independent cooperation and what that could mean for disarmament.
Anticipated Soviet Position
Khrushchev will perhaps begin by saying—as he did to Ambassador Thompson—that he would like very much for the President to understand the Soviet position. He may again add that he had obtained such understanding from President Eisenhower only to have the resultant improving relations deliberately exploded by the Pentagon and others.
He will probably say that the Soviet aim, as presented formally, most recently in his February 17 memorandum to the Chancellor, is not to change anything in Germany, but merely to fix juridically what has happened since World War II. Leaving the situation as it is would cause instability and encourage German revanchists.
The USSR would like to sign a treaty with the East Germans, the West Germans, and the US. The USSR, like the US, desires a unified Germany, but to conceive of a unified Germany under either Adenauer or Ulbricht would be unrealistic. Therefore, let us conclude a treaty with two Germanys.
The USSR and the GDR will join in whatever guarantees are necessary to keep West Berlin the way it is, and no threat from any side will be permitted. US prestige will not suffer. The West Berlin status could be registered with the UN, guaranteed by the Four Powers, and protected by a joint police force or symbolic military forces of the Four Powers stationed in West Berlin.
The existing borders between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic and between Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have legal force but need legal foundation. The Socialist Camp does not want to expand westward and would be prepared to so state in working out a treaty with us. If their wartime allies do not agree, the Socialist countries will sign a treaty with the GDR.
West Berlin is a bone in the throat of US-USSR relations. If Adenauer wants to fight, West Berlin would be a good place to start. The problem of West Berlin must be solved. The USSR desires a negotiated agreement. At this point Khrushchev might indicate a willingness to negotiate an interim agreement. If agreement cannot be reached, the USSR would see no alternative to a treaty with the East Germans, under which control over access to Berlin would become their responsibility.
Khrushchev may conclude by saying that he very much wants the President to understand that his frank desire is not to worsen—but to improve—US-USSR relations as well as USSR-FRG relations. This would make it impossible for aggressive forces to use the present situation to prepare aggression, the significance of which, with nuclear weapons, everyone understands.
If the US and the USSR could reach agreement on Berlin and Germany, it would be a great success, creating an atmosphere of trust in which US and USSR troops could be gradually withdrawn, and which would help disarmament negotiations. If not, Soviet and American troops will continue to confront each other, and the situation will not be one of peace, but one of armistice.
Recommended US Position
The President might wish to say that the new Administration has been giving careful consideration to US policy on Berlin and Germany, but it is difficult to see how there can be much basic change.
The situation in all of Berlin—not West Berlin alone—is abnormal because the situation in all of Germany is abnormal. The central difficulty is, of course, the continued division of Germany. We continue to believe there will be no real solution of the German problem or any real tranquillity in Central Europe until the Germans are reunified. This remains our ultimate aim, and we are not disposed to take any legal or other definitive steps which would appear to perpetuate or legalize the division.
In order that the possibilities of a disastrous miscalculation be reduced, it is absolutely vital for the USSR to understand the following. Berlin is of paramount importance to the US. The US is in Berlin by unimpeachable right of conquest. More importantly, it is there with the overwhelming approval of the people of West Berlin, which has been demonstrated many times in the past and can be easily demonstrated at any time in the future. It is there to protect the freedom of West Berlin, and, under existing circumstances, it is wholly convinced that there is no other way to protect that freedom. We have no intention whatsoever of being forced out of Berlin and will use all means to see that we are not. US concern with strengthening conventional forces should under no circumstances be interpreted as affecting our decision to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend all the NATO area, including Berlin.
We would consider the proposed “separate peace treaty” between the USSR and East Germany and the abandonment by the USSR of its responsibilities to us to be a grave violation of the legal situation in Berlin. Such a unilateral act cannot affect our rights in Berlin, and we are determined to continue to exercise those rights, including specifically the right of access.
In all of this we have the full support of our allies. The West is convinced that its fate is intimately associated with the fate of West Berlin.
But now let us consider why we should avoid a showdown and how we can.
Avoiding a Crisis
There are aspects of the present situation in Germany and Berlin unsatisfactory to the USSR just as there are aspects unsatisfactory to the US. There is, however, nothing in the present situation in Germany and Berlin really intolerable to either. The Soviet Union cannot really believe that the continued existence of West Berlin offers any threat to Soviet security—or indeed to the continued existence of the East German regime. There is, of course, the type of competition foreseen and approved by the Soviet Union as “peaceful coexistence” but a mutual willingness to accept this competition is a fair test of the real meaning of the “peaceful coexistence” concept. For a decade after the Berlin blockade ended until the Soviet initiative of November 1958, the situation in Berlin and Germany was relatively quiet.
Looked at from the historical view, it would clearly seem to be the part of wisdom for the Soviet Union and the Western powers to avoid a sharp confrontation and a crisis situation in Germany and Berlin. As Khrushchev himself has frequently pointed out, the major and overriding international problem of the day is disarmament. To jeopardize progress in this all-important field by forcefully striving for political pains of minor significance compared to disarmament must surely be shortsighted. The problems of Germany, Berlin and European security can be approached in a much more promising context when we have begun to progress toward disarmament. The settlement of these problems would then become immeasurably easier.
Under conditions of increased international tension not only would forward movement on disarmament become most difficult, but there would arise the strong probability of an acceleration of the armaments race.
Negotiations
Khrushchev may well ask whether the West is ready to negotiate about West Berlin. If so, the President might wish to say that he would have to consult with his allies, but that they—with the US—undoubtedly “remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force, but by peaceful means through negotiation” and “remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.”
Discussion
Khrushchev would be less than human if Laos, Cuba, and : Gagarin have not reinforced his normal self-confidence to the point where over-boldness and possible miscalculation could constitute a grave potential menace to the whole world. In such a mood, Berlin must offer a temptation that may very well be too strong to resist. Although Khrushchev is undoubtedly reluctant to risk a major war, the real danger is that he might risk just such a war without realizing he is doing so. He must, therefore, be warned in the firmest and most solemn manner that the US has no intention whatsoever of being forced out of Berlin and that in any attempt to do so he would be taking the gravest possible risk.
...Our objective would be to suggest to Khrushchev that, while the situation in Germany and Berlin cannot be considered satisfactory from the point of view of either of us, it has been, and is, tolerable with no great strain and should be left alone until some significant measure of progress toward disarmament has been made. Conversely, we would be suggesting that an aggressive Soviet policy in Germany may well act to encourage exactly the developments in Germany and Europe which Khrushchev seeks to avoid. A reduction of armaments, on the other hand, would change the entire context within which we approach the problems of Germany and European security with greatly improved prospect for a mutually agreeable settlement.
It is, of course, extremely unlikely that Khrushchev would agree to leave the Berlin situation alone, but this approach might exert some influence toward reducing the terms on which he would agree, either explicitly or implicitly.
Analysis Questions:
1. Which of the three options would you use and why?
a. Call the Soviets' bluff and demand that they back down.
b. Withdraw from Berlin in order to prevent the possibility of military action.
c. Stand your ground in Berlin but assert to the Soviets how this is in their best interest as well.
2. What role do you believe fear plays in the development of this position paper? Does it improve or inhibit the rational thinking of the proposal?
3. How does this document highlight the similarities of goals between the U.S. and the Soviet Union? Why is this important?
May 25, 1961.
BERLIN AND GERMANY
(Khrushchev will undoubtedly raise; if not, President should.)
Two and a half years into the Berlin Crisis it appeared as though the only options were to abandon Berlin or risk open conflict with the Soviets. The purpose of this position paper created by the State Department was to examine a potential middle ground. The State Department believed that the status quo in Berlin was a problem for the USSR but that the Soviets needed to realize changes in that status quo presented the possibility of much greater risks. It encouraged the president to stress to the Soviets the importance of Berlin to us as well as the opportunity for independent cooperation and what that could mean for disarmament.
Anticipated Soviet Position
Khrushchev will perhaps begin by saying—as he did to Ambassador Thompson—that he would like very much for the President to understand the Soviet position. He may again add that he had obtained such understanding from President Eisenhower only to have the resultant improving relations deliberately exploded by the Pentagon and others.
He will probably say that the Soviet aim, as presented formally, most recently in his February 17 memorandum to the Chancellor, is not to change anything in Germany, but merely to fix juridically what has happened since World War II. Leaving the situation as it is would cause instability and encourage German revanchists.
The USSR would like to sign a treaty with the East Germans, the West Germans, and the US. The USSR, like the US, desires a unified Germany, but to conceive of a unified Germany under either Adenauer or Ulbricht would be unrealistic. Therefore, let us conclude a treaty with two Germanys.
The USSR and the GDR will join in whatever guarantees are necessary to keep West Berlin the way it is, and no threat from any side will be permitted. US prestige will not suffer. The West Berlin status could be registered with the UN, guaranteed by the Four Powers, and protected by a joint police force or symbolic military forces of the Four Powers stationed in West Berlin.
The existing borders between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic and between Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have legal force but need legal foundation. The Socialist Camp does not want to expand westward and would be prepared to so state in working out a treaty with us. If their wartime allies do not agree, the Socialist countries will sign a treaty with the GDR.
West Berlin is a bone in the throat of US-USSR relations. If Adenauer wants to fight, West Berlin would be a good place to start. The problem of West Berlin must be solved. The USSR desires a negotiated agreement. At this point Khrushchev might indicate a willingness to negotiate an interim agreement. If agreement cannot be reached, the USSR would see no alternative to a treaty with the East Germans, under which control over access to Berlin would become their responsibility.
Khrushchev may conclude by saying that he very much wants the President to understand that his frank desire is not to worsen—but to improve—US-USSR relations as well as USSR-FRG relations. This would make it impossible for aggressive forces to use the present situation to prepare aggression, the significance of which, with nuclear weapons, everyone understands.
If the US and the USSR could reach agreement on Berlin and Germany, it would be a great success, creating an atmosphere of trust in which US and USSR troops could be gradually withdrawn, and which would help disarmament negotiations. If not, Soviet and American troops will continue to confront each other, and the situation will not be one of peace, but one of armistice.
Recommended US Position
The President might wish to say that the new Administration has been giving careful consideration to US policy on Berlin and Germany, but it is difficult to see how there can be much basic change.
The situation in all of Berlin—not West Berlin alone—is abnormal because the situation in all of Germany is abnormal. The central difficulty is, of course, the continued division of Germany. We continue to believe there will be no real solution of the German problem or any real tranquillity in Central Europe until the Germans are reunified. This remains our ultimate aim, and we are not disposed to take any legal or other definitive steps which would appear to perpetuate or legalize the division.
In order that the possibilities of a disastrous miscalculation be reduced, it is absolutely vital for the USSR to understand the following. Berlin is of paramount importance to the US. The US is in Berlin by unimpeachable right of conquest. More importantly, it is there with the overwhelming approval of the people of West Berlin, which has been demonstrated many times in the past and can be easily demonstrated at any time in the future. It is there to protect the freedom of West Berlin, and, under existing circumstances, it is wholly convinced that there is no other way to protect that freedom. We have no intention whatsoever of being forced out of Berlin and will use all means to see that we are not. US concern with strengthening conventional forces should under no circumstances be interpreted as affecting our decision to use nuclear weapons if necessary to defend all the NATO area, including Berlin.
We would consider the proposed “separate peace treaty” between the USSR and East Germany and the abandonment by the USSR of its responsibilities to us to be a grave violation of the legal situation in Berlin. Such a unilateral act cannot affect our rights in Berlin, and we are determined to continue to exercise those rights, including specifically the right of access.
In all of this we have the full support of our allies. The West is convinced that its fate is intimately associated with the fate of West Berlin.
But now let us consider why we should avoid a showdown and how we can.
Avoiding a Crisis
There are aspects of the present situation in Germany and Berlin unsatisfactory to the USSR just as there are aspects unsatisfactory to the US. There is, however, nothing in the present situation in Germany and Berlin really intolerable to either. The Soviet Union cannot really believe that the continued existence of West Berlin offers any threat to Soviet security—or indeed to the continued existence of the East German regime. There is, of course, the type of competition foreseen and approved by the Soviet Union as “peaceful coexistence” but a mutual willingness to accept this competition is a fair test of the real meaning of the “peaceful coexistence” concept. For a decade after the Berlin blockade ended until the Soviet initiative of November 1958, the situation in Berlin and Germany was relatively quiet.
Looked at from the historical view, it would clearly seem to be the part of wisdom for the Soviet Union and the Western powers to avoid a sharp confrontation and a crisis situation in Germany and Berlin. As Khrushchev himself has frequently pointed out, the major and overriding international problem of the day is disarmament. To jeopardize progress in this all-important field by forcefully striving for political pains of minor significance compared to disarmament must surely be shortsighted. The problems of Germany, Berlin and European security can be approached in a much more promising context when we have begun to progress toward disarmament. The settlement of these problems would then become immeasurably easier.
Under conditions of increased international tension not only would forward movement on disarmament become most difficult, but there would arise the strong probability of an acceleration of the armaments race.
Negotiations
Khrushchev may well ask whether the West is ready to negotiate about West Berlin. If so, the President might wish to say that he would have to consult with his allies, but that they—with the US—undoubtedly “remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force, but by peaceful means through negotiation” and “remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.”
Discussion
Khrushchev would be less than human if Laos, Cuba, and : Gagarin have not reinforced his normal self-confidence to the point where over-boldness and possible miscalculation could constitute a grave potential menace to the whole world. In such a mood, Berlin must offer a temptation that may very well be too strong to resist. Although Khrushchev is undoubtedly reluctant to risk a major war, the real danger is that he might risk just such a war without realizing he is doing so. He must, therefore, be warned in the firmest and most solemn manner that the US has no intention whatsoever of being forced out of Berlin and that in any attempt to do so he would be taking the gravest possible risk.
...Our objective would be to suggest to Khrushchev that, while the situation in Germany and Berlin cannot be considered satisfactory from the point of view of either of us, it has been, and is, tolerable with no great strain and should be left alone until some significant measure of progress toward disarmament has been made. Conversely, we would be suggesting that an aggressive Soviet policy in Germany may well act to encourage exactly the developments in Germany and Europe which Khrushchev seeks to avoid. A reduction of armaments, on the other hand, would change the entire context within which we approach the problems of Germany and European security with greatly improved prospect for a mutually agreeable settlement.
It is, of course, extremely unlikely that Khrushchev would agree to leave the Berlin situation alone, but this approach might exert some influence toward reducing the terms on which he would agree, either explicitly or implicitly.
Analysis Questions:
1. Which of the three options would you use and why?
a. Call the Soviets' bluff and demand that they back down.
b. Withdraw from Berlin in order to prevent the possibility of military action.
c. Stand your ground in Berlin but assert to the Soviets how this is in their best interest as well.
2. What role do you believe fear plays in the development of this position paper? Does it improve or inhibit the rational thinking of the proposal?
3. How does this document highlight the similarities of goals between the U.S. and the Soviet Union? Why is this important?
Source 2.2: The Berlin Crisis Speech
JOHN F. KENNEDY
July 25, 1961
In this address President Kennedy reminded the audience of our commitment to West Berlin and the firmness of our resolve in honoring that commitment. He cautioned any assumption that the U.S. was too weak or too timid to take action in Berlin or in Southeast Asia. However, the bulk of the speech is devoted to explaining the steps being taken to improve our military strength.
The immediate threat to free men is in West Berlin. But that isolated outpost is not an isolated problem. The threat is worldwide. Our effort must be equally wide and strong, and not be obsessed by any single manufactured crisis. We face a challenge in Berlin, but there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia, where the borders are less guarded, the enemy harder to find, and the dangers of communism less apparent to those who have so little. We face a challenge in our own hemisphere, and indeed wherever else the freedom of human beings is at stake.
Let me remind you that the fortunes of war and diplomacy left the free people of West Berlin, in 1945, 110 miles behind the Iron Curtain.
This map makes very clear the problem that we face. The white is West Germany - the East is the area controlled by the Soviet Union, and as you can see from the chart, West Berlin is 110 miles within the area which the Soviets now dominate - which is immediately controlled by the so-called East German regime.
We are there as a result of our victory over Nazi Germany - and our basic rights to be there, deriving from that victory, include both our presence in West Berlin and the enjoyment of access across East Germany. These rights have been repeatedly confirmed and recognized in special agreements with the Soviet Union. Berlin is not a part of East Germany, but a separate territory under the control of the allied powers. Thus our rights there are clear and deep-rooted. But in addition to those rights is our commitment to sustain and defend, if need be - the opportunity for more than two million people to determine their own future and choose their own way of life.
Thus, our presence in West Berlin, and our access thereto, cannot be ended by any act of the Soviet government. The NATO shield was long ago extended to cover West Berlin - and we have given our word that an attack upon that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all.
For West Berlin - lying exposed 110 miles inside East Germany, surrounded by Soviet troops and close to Soviet supply lines-has many roles. It is more than a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a Communist sea. It is even more than a link with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, an escape hatch for refugees.
West Berlin is all of that. But above all it has now become - as never before-the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation.
It would be a mistake for others to look upon Berlin, because of its location, as a tempting target. The United States is there; the United Kingdom and France are there; the pledge of NATO is there - and the people of Berlin are there. It is as secure, in that sense, as the rest of us - for we cannot separate its safety from our own.
I hear it said that West Berlin is militarily untenable. And so was Bastogne. And so, in fact, was Stalingrad. Any dangerous spot is tenable if men - brave men - will make it so.
We do not want to fight-but we have fought before. And others in earlier times have made the same dangerous mistake of assuming that the West was too selfish and too soft and too divided to resist invasions of freedom in other lands. Those who threaten to unleash the forces of war on a dispute over West Berlin should recall the words of the ancient philosopher: "A man who causes fear cannot be free from fear."
We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire Free World.
Soviet strategy has long been aimed, not merely at Berlin, but at dividing and neutralizing all of Europe, forcing us back on our own shores. We must meet our oft-stated pledge to the free peoples of West Berlin - and maintain our rights and their safety, even in the face of force - in order to maintain the confidence of other free peoples in our word and our resolve. The strength of the alliance on which our security depends is dependent in turn on our willingness to meet our commitments to them.
So long as the Communists insist that they are preparing to end by themselves unilaterally our rights in West Berlin and our commitments to its people, we must be prepared to defend those rights and those commitments. We will at all times be ready to talk, if talk will help. But we must also be ready to resist with force, if force is used upon us. Either alone would fail. Together, they can serve the cause of freedom and peace.
The new preparations that we shall make to defend the peace are part of the long-term build-up in our strength which has been underway since January. They are based on our needs to meet a world-wide threat, on a basis which stretches far beyond the present Berlin crisis. Our primary purpose is neither propaganda nor provocation - but preparation.
A first need is to hasten progress toward the military goals which the North Atlantic allies have set for themselves. In Europe today nothing less will suffice. We will put even greater resources into fulfilling those goals, and we look to our allies to do the same.
The supplementary defense build-ups that I asked from the Congress in March and May have already started moving us toward these and our other defense goals. They included an increase in the size of the Marine Corps, improved readiness of our reserves, expansion of our air and sea lift, and stepped-up procurement of needed weapons, ammunition, and other items. To insure a continuing invulnerable capacity to deter or destroy any aggressor, they provided for the strengthening of our missile power and for putting 50 percent of our B52 and B-47 bombers on a ground alert which would send them on their way with 15 minutes' warning.
These measures must be speeded up, and still others must now be taken. We must have sea and air lift capable of moving our forces quickly and in large numbers to any part of the world.
But even more importantly, we need the capability of placing in any critical area at the appropriate time a force which, combined with those of our allies, is large enough to make clear our determination and our ability to defend our rights at all costs - and to meet all levels of aggressor pressure with whatever levels of force are required. We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all - out nuclear action.
While it is unwise at this time either to call up or send abroad excessive numbers of these troops before they are needed, let me make it clear that I intend to take, as time goes on, whatever steps are necessary to make certain that such forces can be deployed at the appropriate time without lessening our ability to meet our commitments elsewhere.
Thus, in the days and months ahead, I shall not hesitate to ask the Congress for additional measures, or exercise any of the executive powers that I possess to meet this threat to peace. Everything essential to the security of freedom must be done; and if that should require more men, or more taxes, or more controls, or other new powers, l shall not hesitate to ask them…
We have another sober responsibility. To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do and where they should go if bombs begin to fall, would be a failure of responsibility. In May, I pledged a new start on Civil Defense. Last week, I assigned, on the recommendation of the Civil Defense Director, basic responsibility for this program to the Secretary of Defense, to make certain it is administered and coordinated with our continental defense efforts at the highest civilian level. Tomorrow, I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives: to identify and mark space in existing structures public and private that could be used for fall-out shelters in case of attack; to stock those shelters with food, water, first-aid kits and other minimum essentials for survival; to increase their capacity; to improve our air-raid warning and fallout detection systems, including a new household warning system which is now under development; and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed.
Analysis Questions:
1. Who do you believe is that target audience of this speech? Why?
2. Is this speech meant to calm the fears of the American people and our allies or to inspire fear in our enemies? Explain.
3. Do you believe that this improved or intensified the standoff over Berlin
JOHN F. KENNEDY
July 25, 1961
In this address President Kennedy reminded the audience of our commitment to West Berlin and the firmness of our resolve in honoring that commitment. He cautioned any assumption that the U.S. was too weak or too timid to take action in Berlin or in Southeast Asia. However, the bulk of the speech is devoted to explaining the steps being taken to improve our military strength.
The immediate threat to free men is in West Berlin. But that isolated outpost is not an isolated problem. The threat is worldwide. Our effort must be equally wide and strong, and not be obsessed by any single manufactured crisis. We face a challenge in Berlin, but there is also a challenge in Southeast Asia, where the borders are less guarded, the enemy harder to find, and the dangers of communism less apparent to those who have so little. We face a challenge in our own hemisphere, and indeed wherever else the freedom of human beings is at stake.
Let me remind you that the fortunes of war and diplomacy left the free people of West Berlin, in 1945, 110 miles behind the Iron Curtain.
This map makes very clear the problem that we face. The white is West Germany - the East is the area controlled by the Soviet Union, and as you can see from the chart, West Berlin is 110 miles within the area which the Soviets now dominate - which is immediately controlled by the so-called East German regime.
We are there as a result of our victory over Nazi Germany - and our basic rights to be there, deriving from that victory, include both our presence in West Berlin and the enjoyment of access across East Germany. These rights have been repeatedly confirmed and recognized in special agreements with the Soviet Union. Berlin is not a part of East Germany, but a separate territory under the control of the allied powers. Thus our rights there are clear and deep-rooted. But in addition to those rights is our commitment to sustain and defend, if need be - the opportunity for more than two million people to determine their own future and choose their own way of life.
Thus, our presence in West Berlin, and our access thereto, cannot be ended by any act of the Soviet government. The NATO shield was long ago extended to cover West Berlin - and we have given our word that an attack upon that city will be regarded as an attack upon us all.
For West Berlin - lying exposed 110 miles inside East Germany, surrounded by Soviet troops and close to Soviet supply lines-has many roles. It is more than a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a Communist sea. It is even more than a link with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, an escape hatch for refugees.
West Berlin is all of that. But above all it has now become - as never before-the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation.
It would be a mistake for others to look upon Berlin, because of its location, as a tempting target. The United States is there; the United Kingdom and France are there; the pledge of NATO is there - and the people of Berlin are there. It is as secure, in that sense, as the rest of us - for we cannot separate its safety from our own.
I hear it said that West Berlin is militarily untenable. And so was Bastogne. And so, in fact, was Stalingrad. Any dangerous spot is tenable if men - brave men - will make it so.
We do not want to fight-but we have fought before. And others in earlier times have made the same dangerous mistake of assuming that the West was too selfish and too soft and too divided to resist invasions of freedom in other lands. Those who threaten to unleash the forces of war on a dispute over West Berlin should recall the words of the ancient philosopher: "A man who causes fear cannot be free from fear."
We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire Free World.
Soviet strategy has long been aimed, not merely at Berlin, but at dividing and neutralizing all of Europe, forcing us back on our own shores. We must meet our oft-stated pledge to the free peoples of West Berlin - and maintain our rights and their safety, even in the face of force - in order to maintain the confidence of other free peoples in our word and our resolve. The strength of the alliance on which our security depends is dependent in turn on our willingness to meet our commitments to them.
So long as the Communists insist that they are preparing to end by themselves unilaterally our rights in West Berlin and our commitments to its people, we must be prepared to defend those rights and those commitments. We will at all times be ready to talk, if talk will help. But we must also be ready to resist with force, if force is used upon us. Either alone would fail. Together, they can serve the cause of freedom and peace.
The new preparations that we shall make to defend the peace are part of the long-term build-up in our strength which has been underway since January. They are based on our needs to meet a world-wide threat, on a basis which stretches far beyond the present Berlin crisis. Our primary purpose is neither propaganda nor provocation - but preparation.
A first need is to hasten progress toward the military goals which the North Atlantic allies have set for themselves. In Europe today nothing less will suffice. We will put even greater resources into fulfilling those goals, and we look to our allies to do the same.
The supplementary defense build-ups that I asked from the Congress in March and May have already started moving us toward these and our other defense goals. They included an increase in the size of the Marine Corps, improved readiness of our reserves, expansion of our air and sea lift, and stepped-up procurement of needed weapons, ammunition, and other items. To insure a continuing invulnerable capacity to deter or destroy any aggressor, they provided for the strengthening of our missile power and for putting 50 percent of our B52 and B-47 bombers on a ground alert which would send them on their way with 15 minutes' warning.
These measures must be speeded up, and still others must now be taken. We must have sea and air lift capable of moving our forces quickly and in large numbers to any part of the world.
But even more importantly, we need the capability of placing in any critical area at the appropriate time a force which, combined with those of our allies, is large enough to make clear our determination and our ability to defend our rights at all costs - and to meet all levels of aggressor pressure with whatever levels of force are required. We intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all - out nuclear action.
While it is unwise at this time either to call up or send abroad excessive numbers of these troops before they are needed, let me make it clear that I intend to take, as time goes on, whatever steps are necessary to make certain that such forces can be deployed at the appropriate time without lessening our ability to meet our commitments elsewhere.
Thus, in the days and months ahead, I shall not hesitate to ask the Congress for additional measures, or exercise any of the executive powers that I possess to meet this threat to peace. Everything essential to the security of freedom must be done; and if that should require more men, or more taxes, or more controls, or other new powers, l shall not hesitate to ask them…
We have another sober responsibility. To recognize the possibilities of nuclear war in the missile age, without our citizens knowing what they should do and where they should go if bombs begin to fall, would be a failure of responsibility. In May, I pledged a new start on Civil Defense. Last week, I assigned, on the recommendation of the Civil Defense Director, basic responsibility for this program to the Secretary of Defense, to make certain it is administered and coordinated with our continental defense efforts at the highest civilian level. Tomorrow, I am requesting of the Congress new funds for the following immediate objectives: to identify and mark space in existing structures public and private that could be used for fall-out shelters in case of attack; to stock those shelters with food, water, first-aid kits and other minimum essentials for survival; to increase their capacity; to improve our air-raid warning and fallout detection systems, including a new household warning system which is now under development; and to take other measures that will be effective at an early date to save millions of lives if needed.
Analysis Questions:
1. Who do you believe is that target audience of this speech? Why?
2. Is this speech meant to calm the fears of the American people and our allies or to inspire fear in our enemies? Explain.
3. Do you believe that this improved or intensified the standoff over Berlin
Source 2.3: Letter From President Kennedy to Governing Mayor Brandt
August 18, 1961
In response to the closing of the border crossings and the construction of the wall JFK received a letter from West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt. The following is JFK's response that attempted to calm Brandt's fears of abandonment. He reassured Brandt that while they share a common goal of a reunited Germany there is no recourse available to them other than the bolstering of military forces as a deterrent. However, Kennedy pointed out that it is this action is not a show of Soviet power but an admission of weakness. To Kennedy the wall was a sign that the Soviets realized that the Americans would not abandon West Berlin and that it would not fall to communism.
The measures taken by the Soviet Government and its puppets in East Berlin have caused revulsion here in America. This demonstration of what the Soviet Government means by freedom for a city, and peace for a people, proves the hollowness of Soviet pretensions; and Americans understand that this action necessarily constitutes a special blow to the people of West Berlin, connected as they remain in a myriad of ways to their fellow Berliners in the eastern sector. So I understand entirely the deep concerns and sense of trouble which prompted your letter.
Grave as this matter is, however, there are, as you say, no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation. Since it represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness, this brutal border closing evidently represents a basic Soviet decision which only war could reverse. Neither you nor we, nor any of our Allies, have ever supposed that we should go to war on this point.
Yet the Soviet action is too serious for inadequate responses. My own objection to most of the measures which have been proposed—even to most of the suggestions in your own letter—is that they are mere trifles compared to what has been done. Some of them, moreover, seem unlikely to be fruitful even in their own terms. This is our present judgment, for example, on the question of an immediate appeal to the United Nations, although we shall continue to keep this possibility under lively review.
On careful consideration I myself have decided that the best immediate response is a significant reinforcement of the Western garrisons. The importance of this reinforcement is symbolic—but not symbolic only. We know that the Soviet Union continues to emphasize its demand for the removal of Allied protection from West Berlin. We believe that even a modest reinforcement will underline our rejection of this concept.
At the same time, and of even greater basic importance, we shall continue and accelerate the broad buildup of the military strength of the West upon which we are decided, and which we view as the necessary answer to the long-range Soviet threat to Berlin and to us all.
More broadly, let me urge it upon you that we must not be shaken by Soviet actions which in themselves are a confession of weakness. West Berlin today is more important than ever, and its mission to stand for freedom has never been so important as now. The link of West Berlin to the Free World is not a matter of rhetoric. Important as the ties to the East have been, painful as is their violation, the life of the city, as I understand it, runs primarily to the West—its economic life, its moral basis, and its military security. You may wish to consider and to suggest concrete ways in which these ties might be expanded in a fashion that would make the citizens of West Berlin more actively conscious of their role, not merely as an outpost of freedom, but as a vital part of the Free World and all its enterprises. In this double mission we are partners, and it is my own confidence that we can continue to rely upon each other as firmly in the future as we have in the past.
Analysis Questions:
1. How does the building of the wall create a problem for Kennedy?
2. How does he respond to this problem? Do you agree with his actions?
3. In what ways does Kennedy seem optimistic? Is this genuine?
August 18, 1961
In response to the closing of the border crossings and the construction of the wall JFK received a letter from West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt. The following is JFK's response that attempted to calm Brandt's fears of abandonment. He reassured Brandt that while they share a common goal of a reunited Germany there is no recourse available to them other than the bolstering of military forces as a deterrent. However, Kennedy pointed out that it is this action is not a show of Soviet power but an admission of weakness. To Kennedy the wall was a sign that the Soviets realized that the Americans would not abandon West Berlin and that it would not fall to communism.
The measures taken by the Soviet Government and its puppets in East Berlin have caused revulsion here in America. This demonstration of what the Soviet Government means by freedom for a city, and peace for a people, proves the hollowness of Soviet pretensions; and Americans understand that this action necessarily constitutes a special blow to the people of West Berlin, connected as they remain in a myriad of ways to their fellow Berliners in the eastern sector. So I understand entirely the deep concerns and sense of trouble which prompted your letter.
Grave as this matter is, however, there are, as you say, no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation. Since it represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness, this brutal border closing evidently represents a basic Soviet decision which only war could reverse. Neither you nor we, nor any of our Allies, have ever supposed that we should go to war on this point.
Yet the Soviet action is too serious for inadequate responses. My own objection to most of the measures which have been proposed—even to most of the suggestions in your own letter—is that they are mere trifles compared to what has been done. Some of them, moreover, seem unlikely to be fruitful even in their own terms. This is our present judgment, for example, on the question of an immediate appeal to the United Nations, although we shall continue to keep this possibility under lively review.
On careful consideration I myself have decided that the best immediate response is a significant reinforcement of the Western garrisons. The importance of this reinforcement is symbolic—but not symbolic only. We know that the Soviet Union continues to emphasize its demand for the removal of Allied protection from West Berlin. We believe that even a modest reinforcement will underline our rejection of this concept.
At the same time, and of even greater basic importance, we shall continue and accelerate the broad buildup of the military strength of the West upon which we are decided, and which we view as the necessary answer to the long-range Soviet threat to Berlin and to us all.
More broadly, let me urge it upon you that we must not be shaken by Soviet actions which in themselves are a confession of weakness. West Berlin today is more important than ever, and its mission to stand for freedom has never been so important as now. The link of West Berlin to the Free World is not a matter of rhetoric. Important as the ties to the East have been, painful as is their violation, the life of the city, as I understand it, runs primarily to the West—its economic life, its moral basis, and its military security. You may wish to consider and to suggest concrete ways in which these ties might be expanded in a fashion that would make the citizens of West Berlin more actively conscious of their role, not merely as an outpost of freedom, but as a vital part of the Free World and all its enterprises. In this double mission we are partners, and it is my own confidence that we can continue to rely upon each other as firmly in the future as we have in the past.
Analysis Questions:
1. How does the building of the wall create a problem for Kennedy?
2. How does he respond to this problem? Do you agree with his actions?
3. In what ways does Kennedy seem optimistic? Is this genuine?
Sources - berlin crisis
Source 2.1: Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State, May 25, 1961, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962, 71-75, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v14/d26
Source 2.2: John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/Berlin-Crisis_19610725.aspx
Source 2.3: Letter From President Kennedy to Governing Mayor Brandt, August 18, 1961, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962, 352-353, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v14/d120
Source 2.2: John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/Berlin-Crisis_19610725.aspx
Source 2.3: Letter From President Kennedy to Governing Mayor Brandt, August 18, 1961, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 14, Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962, 352-353, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v14/d120